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Mastering Imperial Space? 
The Ambivalent Impact of Railway-Building in Tsarist Russia 
Until recently, comparative historical research on European empires has 
mainly focused on the question of how the different imperial elites ad-
dressed the problem of  political rule over a variety of  ethnic, religious, and 
cultural groups in the nineteenth century. 1 The strategies that were devel-
oped and deployed in the Ottoman, the Habsburg, and the Russian em-
pires to exert control over their large and expanding territories have not 
been analysed in comparable depth so far.2 In Tsarist Russia, which in the 
late nineteenth century constituted the largest continental empire in the 
world, the consolidation of  imperial space seemed to be an issue of special 
concern. "Russia suffers from its geographical magnitude;' Tsar Nicholas I 
once complained. 3 This statement pointed not only to the large distances 
separating the capital of St. Petersburg from the imperial peripheries but 
also to the poor condition of Russian roads and waterways. When news of  
the first public railway in Western Europe reached St. Petersburg in the 
1820s, progressive scholars and engineers soon argued that Russia with her 
underdeveloped network of  communications and her "vast territorial ex-
1 For the state of the art in contemporary historiography on the Russian Empire: 
R. Vulpius, "Das Imperium als Thema der Russischen Geschichte", Zeitenblicke 6 (2007) 2, 
URL: http://www.zeitenblicke.de/2007/2/vulpius/index_html (24.12.2007).
2 F. B. Schenk, "Imperiale Raumerschließung: Beherrschung der russischen Weite", 
Osteuropa 3 (2005), 33-45. New scholarship stresses the importance of"territoriality" for 
the understanding of polities such as the Russian Empire: J. Burbank and M. von Hagen, 
"Coming Into the Territory: Uncertainty and Empire", in Russian Empire. Space, People, 
Power. 1700-1930, ed. idem, A. Remnev (Bloomington, 2007), 1-29, 5, 21. On the concept 
of "territoriality" in general: C. S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History", 
American Historical Review 105 (2000), 807-831, 819-821. On the impact of modern 
technology on imperial rule in colonial empires: D. Headrick, The Tools of Empire. Tech-
nology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1981); D. van Laak, 
Imperiale Infrastruktur. Deutsche Planungen für die Erschließung Afrikas 1880 bis 1960 
(Paderborn,2004),35-43. 
3 R. M. Haywood, The Beginnings of Railway Development in Russia in the Reign of 
Nicholas I. 1835-1842 (Durham, 1969), 230. 
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tension" almost begged for the construction of  railways. 4 Pavel Mel'nikov, 
a young Russian engineer and later Russia's first Minister of Communi-
cations, enthusiastically exclaimed in 1838 that the railways had been "in-
vented for Russia more than for any other country in Europe."5
1. Infrastructures: an O bject of Imperial History
For a long time, historians have been treating the history of  infrastructures 
primarily from the perspective of economic history. 6 At the same time it has 
been often overlooked that railways in nineteenth-century empires were also 
constructed for political and strategic purposes. This holds especially true 
for Tsarist Russia. After the defeat in the Crimean War, Tsar Alexander II 
gave the green light to construction of  a network of railways in European 
Russia in 1857 primarily out of  strategic considerations. Apart from two 
trunk lines connecting St, Petersburg with Moscow and Warsaw with 
Vienna, Russia had not constructed any major public railways before the 
outbreak o f  the war against France, England and the Ottoman Empire in 
1853. 7 The difficulties of  supplying the fortress of Sevastopol at the southern 
frontier with troops and provisions and the disgraceful defeat against the 
European powers on home territory highlighted the urgent need to develop 
and modernize Russia's infrastructures. Whereas before the Crimean War 
the transport policy ofNicholas I had been influenced mainly by traditional-
ists and proponents of  canal and road construction, his successor Alexander 
II gave his support to the competing ideological camp of  railway enthusiasts. 
On January 26, 1857 the Tsar-reformer issued a decree calling the construc-
4 One of the first proposals for the construction of a public railway in Russia was for-
mulated by N. P. Shcheglov, 0 zheleznykh dorogakh i preimushchestve ikh nad obyknoven-
nymi dorogami i kanalami (St Petersburg, 1830), 5. 
5 P. P. Mel'nikov, "Svedeniia o russkikh zheleznykh dorogakh': in P. P. Mel'nikov. Inz-
hener, Uchenyi, Gosudarstvennyi deiatel; ed. Ivi. I. Voronin et al. (St Petersburg, 2003), 
223-398, 276. 
6 M. Beaumont and M. Freeman, "Preface", in The Railway and Modernity. Time, 
Space, and the Machine Ensemble, ed. idem (Oxford, 2007), 7-11, 9. Two Russian publi-
cations confirming this observation: E. Ia. Kraskovskii, ed., Istoriia zheleznodorozhnogo 
transporta Rossii, vol. 1: 1836-1917 (St Petersburg, 1994); A. M. Solov'eva, Zheleznodo-
rozhnyi transport Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. (Moscow, 1975). - On new methodologi-
cal approaches in the historiography of infrastructures: D. van Laak, "Infra-Strukturge-
schichte': Geschichte und Gesellschaft 27 (2001), 367-393; J. I. Engels and J. Obertreis, 
"Infrastrukturen in der Modeme: Einführung in ein junges Forschungsfeld", Saeculum. 
Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte 58 (2007), 1-12. 
7 Kraskovskii, Istoriia zheleznodorozhnogo transporta Rossii, vol. I, 75. 
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tion of a network of railways in European Russia a "national endeavour" and 
the expression of the "common wish." 8 
The idea to supply Russia with a functioning and effective network of rail-
ways confronted the economically backward country with great difficulties. 
Large distances had tobe bridged, andin the early phase of railway construc-
tion all the necessary technical equipment had tobe imported from Western 
Europe. Besides private investors both from Russia and abroad, the Tsarist 
government was also an important player in the field of railway-building 
throughout the nineteenth century. The state kept an eye on plans and con-
cessions for new railways, offered private entrepreneurs fixed bonus rates for 
their invested capital, and became itself a major investor in important trunk 
lines. Especially when a railway seemed to be of great strategic and military 
importance, the government mobilized state funds to cover the costs of con-
struction and operation. For example, the three trans-continental lines, the 
Trans-Caspian, the Trans-Siberian, and the Orenburg-Tashkent Railways, 
were entirely financed by the Tsarist government.9 
Despite the fact that the Russian Empire initially was not among the 
avant-garde in railway construction in Europe, in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century the country's network of railways grew rapidly.10 
Whereas in the period between 1857 and the end of the 1880s railways were 
mainly built in the European part of the realm, the Asian periphery was con-
nected with the Russian heartland in the 1890s and later. In 1900 Russia al-
ready possessed the second largest network of railways in the world - a fact 
that reflected more the length of railway lines in operation than the density 
8 Ukaz "O sooruzhenii pervoi seti zheleznykh dorog v Rossii" in Polnoe Sobranie Za-
konov Rossiiskoi Imperii. Sobranie vtoroe, vol. XXXII: Otdelenie pervoe. 1857 (St Peters-
burg, 1858),no. 31448, 72-92, 73. 
9 On the Trans-Caspian Railway (1880-1888): W. E. Wheeler, "The Control of Land 
Routes: Russian Railways in Central Asia'; Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 21 
(1934), 585-608; D. W. Spring, "Railways and Economic Development in Turkestan Be-
fore 1917", in Russian Transport. A Historical and Geographical Survey, ed. L. Symons and 
C. White (London, 1975), 46-74; Z. K. Akhmedzhanova, Zheleznodorozhnoe stroitel'stvo v
srednei Azii i Kazakhstane (konets XIX - nachalo XX v.) (Tashkent, 1984), 17-24; On the 
Trans-Siberian Railway ( 1891-1903): S. Marks, Raad to Power. The Trans-Siberian Railway 
and the Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850-1917 (Ithaca, 1991); J. de Cars and J.-P. Cara-
calla, Die Transsibirische Bahn. Geschichte der längsten Bahn der Welt (Zurich, 1987); On 
the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway (1900-1906): Akhmedzhanova, Zheleznodorozhnoe stroi-
tel'stvo v srednei Azii, 29-32; S. N. Abashin, ed., Tsentral'naia Aziia v sostave Rossiiskoi im-
perii (Moscow, 2008), 144. 
10 J. M. Westwood, A History of Russian Railways (London, 1964); Haywood, The 
Beginnings of Railway Development; idem, Russia Enters the Railway Age, 1845-1855 (New 
York, 1998); Solov'eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport Rossii; Kraskovskii, Istoriia zhelezno-
dorozhnogo transporta Rossii, vol. 1. 
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of the entire network, which of course remained rather low in comparison, 
for example, with the German or the Habsburg Empire. 11 
2. Railways: an Instrument of Imperial Rule
The network of railways contributed significantly to the economic progress 
of the Tsarist Empire, especially in the era of rapid industrialization in Russia 
after 1890. However, the new means of communication was not only an im-
portant tool to boost commerce and the development of Russia's heavy in-
dustry. Steam engines and trains were used by the Tsarist regime from the 
very beginning as instruments of imperial rule. The validity of this thesis 
may be illustrated with four examples. 
First, the Russian railways played an important role as a means of trans-
portation for troops and prisoners from one part of the country to the other. 
Among the first official documents regulating traffic on the railway from St. 
Petersburg to Moscow were the instructions for the relocation of detainees 
and soldiers in the l 850s. 12 Nicholas I was fascinated by the idea of using the 
railways for the quick relocation of his army in order to suppress internal 
political revolts. The Austrian engineer and entrepreneur Franz Anton von 
Gerstner, who tried to convince the Tsar in 1835 of the necessity of a network 
of railways in European Russia, highlighted in his memorandum ofJanuary 6 
that England had successfully used the railway from Manchester to Liver-
pool for the transport of troops to contain a revolt (bezpokoistvie) in Ire-
land.13 This was obviously meant as an allusion to the events of the Novem-
ber Uprising in the Polish Kingdom in 1830-31. Gerstner stressed that a 
railway between Moscow and St. Petersburg would enable the government 
to transfer large army units from one city to the other within two days. An-
other railway connecting the river Volga with Moscow would substantially 
facilitate the supply of troops in the capital. 14 
From the moment Russia's first overland railways were inaugurated they 
were used by the regime to consolidate its power within the empire's borders 
11 H.-D. Löwe, "Von der Industrialisierung zur ersten Revolution 1890 bis 1904", in 
Handbuch der Geschichte Rußlands, vol. 3/1, ed. G. Schramm (Stuttgart, 1983) 203-335, 
224; B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750-1970 (New York, 1976), 584. 
12 Glavnoe Upravlenie Putei Soobshcheniia i Publichnykh Zdanii, Polozhenie o 
perevozke arestantov po S.-Peterburgo-Moskovskoi zheleznoi doroge, Utv. 16. 07. 1853 
(St Petersburg, 1853 ); Polozhenie o perevozke bashkirskikh 4-go i 3-go polkov po S.-Pe-
terburgo-Moskovskoi zheleznoi doroge iz Moskvy v S.-Peterburg v ianvare 1855 goda, 
Utv. 22. 11. 1854 (St Petersburg, 1854). 
13 Krasnyi Arkhiv 3 ( 1936) 76, 90. 
14 Krasnyi Arkhiv 3 (1936) 76, 92. 
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and beyond. In 1849 Nicholas 1, the 'gendarme of Europe', moved his loyal 
troops from Warsaw to Vienna via railway to contain the revolution in Hun-
gary.15 In 1863 the railway between St. Petersburg and Warsaw enabled the 
autocratic regime to quickly dispatch guard regiments to the Western prov-
inces and the Polish Kingdom to curb the January Uprising.16 In the after-
math of the first Russian Revolution of 1905, the Trans-Siberian Railway car-
ried the infamous punitive battalions of the generals Paul von Rennenkampf 
and Alexander Meller-Zakomel' sky to the Far East, where they restored the 
autocratic regime with brutality in the so-called 'Chita republic' and other 
regions that had been in turmoil. 17 In peacetime, the network of Russian 
railways helped the Ministry of War to relocate troops from one part of the 
countryto the other. In 1875 approximately 1.6 million soldiers travelled the 
Russian railways.18 In 1912 this number reached 8.6 million. These figures, 
of course, rose rapidly in war time. In 1878, during the Russian-Ottoman 
war, railway statistics registered 7.5 million army passengers. In 1905, in 
the context of the military conflict with Japan, this number reached 11.8 
million.19 
Second, railways served as an important tool to strengthen Russia's exter-
nal borders against potential aggressors from outside and to prepare for 
further territorial expansion. The history of the Great Siberian Railway 
( Velikii Sibirskii Put') is a good example. Alexander III ordered the state-
funded construction of the trans-continental railway in 1891 primarily for 
strategic reasons. Reports from the governor-generals in Irkutsk and the 
Amur region in 1886, informing the Tsar about an increasing incursion of 
Chinese migrants into the provinces of Russia's Far East and about the dis-
concerting activities of England in this region, alarmed the Russian em-
15 M. Annenkov, "Voennaia sluzhba zheleznykh dorog", Voennyi sbornik 19 (1876), 
112-142, 115-116; Regierungsrat Wernekke, "Die Mitwirkung der Eisenbahnen an den 
Kriegen in Mitteleuropa': Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen 35 (1912), 930-958, 930; W. Baum-
gart, "Eisenbahnen und Kriegsführung in der Geschichte", Technikgeschichte 38 (1971),
191-219, 202. 
16 L. G. Zakharova, ed., Vospominaniia general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitriia Alekseevi-
cha Miliutina. 1863-1864 (Moscow, 2003), 46, 54-58. 
17 A. P. Korelin and S. V. Tiutiukin, eds., Pervaia revoliutsiia v Rossii. Vzgliad cherez 
stoletie (Moscow, 2005), 381-382; L. Trotzki, "Ergebnisse und Perspektiven", in idem, Er-
gebnisse und Perspektiven. Die permanente Revolution (Frankfurt/Main, 1971 ), 43. 
18 Statisticheskii sbornik Ministerstva putei soobshcheniia, no. 15 (St Petersburg, 1887), 
Tab!. VI. For the year 1875 the statistics give only one figure for both soldiers and prison-
ers: 1.892 million. If we assume that in this year the number of detainees who travelled the 
Russian railways was approximately the same as in 1879 (231,000), we can deduce for 1875 
the number of 1.66 million soldier-passengers on Russian trains. 
19 Statisticheskii sbornik Ministerstva putei soobshcheniia, no. 131, vol. 2-3, VII and 
Tab!. VII (St Petersburg, 1915); no. 15, Tab!. VI.; no. 89 (St Petersburg, 1907), Tab!. VII. 
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peror. 20 The decision to finally start the construction of the langest railway 
in the world put an end to an intense public debate, also conducted within 
the Tsarist administration, questioning the necessity of, and discussing vari-
ous options for, establishing a railway connection between Siberia and the 
Russian heartland. In the end the emperor's fear concerning the vulnerabil-
ity of Russia's possessions in the Far East proved to carry more weight than 
the warnings of conservative advisers who kept stressing that the gigantic 
venture would min the empire's finances. While planning the layout of the 
line from the Urals to the Pacific, for financial reasons the idea was born in 
St. Petersburg to build the last section of the railway through Manchuria, on 
Chinese territory. The plan to build the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) im-
bued the project of the Trans-Siberian Railway with a clear imperialistic 
quality.21 Whereas the Minister of Finance Sergei Witte regarded the link 
through Manchuria primarily as an instrument of 'peaceful' economic pen-
etration into China, the CER gave occasion to colonial and expansionist fan-
tasies for the Minister ofWar, the Minister of the Imperial Navy and, last but 
not least, for Tsar Nicholas II himself.22 The CER was Russia's contribution 
to the European game of railway imperialism in Asia and an important rea-
son for the worsening ofRussia's relations with England and Japan at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century. 23 
Third, railways in the Russian Empire were envisioned from the very be-
ginning as a tool of territorial consolidation and cultural homogenization. 
The idea that the steam engine might help 'reduce' the country's vast terri-
torial expanses and thereby facilitate political control in the large empire was 
introduced into the Russian railway discourse in 1835 by Franz Anton von 
Gerstner. The Austrian entrepreneur argued that 
"in no other country of the earth [ the construction of) railways seems tobe as profitable 
(vygodno) and necessary (neobkhodimo) as in Russia, because they diminish great dis-
tances with the help of fast movement. Only when the orders (poveleniia) of the ruler are 
20 Marks, Road to Power, 94; Cars and Caracalla, Die Transsibirische Bahn, 25-26. 
21 R. E. Gladfelter, "Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Eastern Railway", in 
Railway Imperialism, ed. D. C. Baldwin and K. E. Wilburn (New York, 1991), 137-154; 
C. Divall, "Railway Imperialisms, Railway Nationalisms", in Die Internationalität der 
Eisenbahn. 1850-1970, ed. M. Burri (Zurich, 2003), 195-209, 205; R. Lee, "Railways and 
Imperialism", in Working Papers in Railway Studies 5 (1999), 4; S. Urbansky, Kolonialer 
Wettstreit. Russland, China, Japan und die Ostchinesische Eisenbahn (Frankfurt/Main,
2008). 
22 D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Toward the Rising Sun. Russian Ideologies o f  Em-
pire and the Path to War with Japan (DeKalb, 2001), 75. 
23 F. B. Schenk, "Kommunikation und Raum im Jahr 1905: Die Eisenbahn in Krieg 
und Revolution", in Russland 1905. Perspektiven auf die erste Revolution im Zaren reich, ed. 
M. Aust and L. Steindorff (Frankfurt/Main, 2007), 47-67, 50-57.
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submitted by railway from St Petersburg to Kazan or Odessa within three days, will the 
good deeds (blagodeianiia) conceived by his majesty for his subjects have the intended im-
pact in such an immeasurably big country (neizmerimaia strana)."24
Gerstner was an admirer of railway construction in the United States. He 
tried to convince the Russian emperor and the Tsarist administration that 
"the railways are as important for Russia as they are for North America: there the inhab-
itants have understood that the two most powerful enemies of the Union are space and 
time and that both can be subdued only by railways; railways can serve also here [i.e. in 
Russia] both as an iron and a golden chain binding together the parts of the truly immense 
empire."25 
Despite the fact that Gerstner was not able to realize his plans for a railway 
network in European Russia, his appreciation of  the impact that this new 
means of communication should have on Russia's territorial cohesion re-
mained a strong element in the political discourse of  the following decades. 
Throughout the second half of  the nineteenth century the debate on railway 
construction in Russia was dominated by voices stressing the importance of  
steam engines and railway tracks for the consolidation of Russia's territorial 
unity. Mikhail Katkov, an admirer of German railway policy, in 1883 pro-
claimed in the newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti that "after the bayonet, it is 
the railways that consummate national cohesion."26
When dreams to explore Russia's Asian provinces with the help of railways 
were transformed into feasible projects in the last third of  the nineteenth 
century, engineers and administrators in the Ministry of Communications 
believed that the steam engines would not only bring economic wealth to the 
imperial peripheries, but also spread the sparks of civilization in these re-
gions and, thereby, strengthen the economic and cultural bonds with the 
European centre. In the 1850s, Russian railway enthusiasts, who developed 
utopian projects envisioning the "reduction of  the distance between Europe 
and Central Asia (sblizhenie srednei Azii i Evropy);' proclaimed: 
"It is an indisputable truth: where a region is explored by railways, we observe tidiness, re-
fined manners, cleanliness, order, comfort and virtuousness [ ... ] we detect the dawn of 
new regional wealth; new fields of activity and economic initiative are opened up for dili-
24 Krasnyi Arkhiv 3 (1936) 76, 92. 
25 F. A. von Gerstner, über die Vortheile der Anlage einer Eisenbahn von St. Peters-
burg nach Zarskoe-Selo und Pawlowsk, deren Ausführung durch eine Akziengesellschaft mit 
Allerhöchstem Privilegium Seiner Kaiserlichen Majestät statt findet (St Petersburg, 1836), 
65. 
26 Moskovskie vedomosti, 4. 8. 1883, cit.: V. A. Tvardovskaia, Ideologiia poreformen-
nogo samoderzhaviia. M. N. Katkov i ego izdaniia (Moscow, 1978), 79. English Translation: 
R. Wortman, Scenarios of Power. Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy. Pram Peter the 
Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II. New Abridged One- Volume Paperback Edition 
(Princeton, 2006), 300. 
gent men; here we have enlightenment and the arts which disperse their blessings to all 
strata of the human family:'27 
About fortyyears later, in November 1892, Minister ofFinance Witte, one of 
the moving forces behind the Trans-Siberian Railway, argued in a report to 
Tsar Alexander III that "despite the fact that Siberia had been [for a long 
time] an integral part of Russia (chast' Rossii), it had not benefited from the 
country's civil (grazhdanskie), cultural and economic successes so far." The 
new transcontinental railway would not only reduce the distance between 
Siberia and European Russia (priblizit'), but also accustom the region to 
"Russian life". 28 
Russian railwaymen, sent to the Asian peripheries to build and operate 
the trans-continental railways, were envisioned as agents of  Russia's civili-
zing mission in the East.29 In the 1890s and later these envoys of European 
culture were supposed to be supported by peasant colonists who were to be 
transferred from overpopulated areas in the Western and central provinces 
to the virgin lands of  Siberia and Central Asia in order to strengthen the Rus-
sian element in these regions.30 Indeed, for the period after 1893 the statistics 
of the Russian Ministry of  Communications report growing numbers of  
railway passengers travelling eastwards as rural colonists. In 1900 this 
number reached one million. The movement of colonists to the Eastern 
provinces reached its peak in 1907 with 3.5 million pereselentsy.3 1 Between 
1891 and 1914 the Trans-Siberian Railway helped transfer about five million 
Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Russian colonists to the virgin lands in the vast 
expanses: to the 'promised land' of  Siberia. 32
Fourth, railways that were planned and constructed primarily for econ-
omic reasons can also be regarded as instruments of imperial rule. Plans to 
explore the periphery of the empire with the help of railways were recur-
rently perceived by representatives of  the local elite as an attempt of the im-
27 G. Liubanskii, Sblizhenie Srednei Azii i Evropy pomoshch'iu zheleznykh dorog (St Pe-
tersburg, 1858), 4. 
28 S. Iu. Vitte, "Vsepoddanneishii doklad upravliaiushchego ministerstva finansov o 
sposobakh sooruzheniia Velikogo Sibirskogo Zheleznodorozhnogo puti i o naznachenii 
soveshchaniia dlia obsuzhdeniia sego dela. 6 noiabria 1892 g." in idem, Sobranie sochinenij 
i dokumental'nykh materialov v piati tomakh, vol. 1: Puti soobshcheniia i ekonomicheskoe 
razvitie Rossii, book 2, part 1 (Moscow, 2004) 159-183, 160. 
29 "Vesti iz Sibiri", Zheleznodorozhnoe de/o 9 (1890), 317-318, 317. 
30 Vitte, "Vsepoddanneishii doklad''. 161-163, 173; W. Sunderland, "The 'Coloniz-
ation Question': Visions of Colonization in Late Imperial Russia", Jahrbücher für Ge-
schichte Osteuropas 48 (2000), 210-232, 221-224. 
31 Statisticheskii sbornik Ministerstva putei soobshcheniia, no. 81 (St Petersburg, 1905), 
Tab!. VII; no. 113 (St Petersburg, 1912), vol. 2, Tab!. VII. 
32 Marks, Road to Power, 155. 
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perial centre to exploit the wealth of the periphery in a colonial manner. The 
resistance of the so-called Siberian 'regionalists' led by Nikolai Iadrintsev 
and Gregorii Potanin against the construction of the Great Siberian Railway 
at the end of the 1880s is widely known.33 They argued that this gigantic pro-
ject would only help the imperial centre to exploit the region's natural re-
sources and, thus, consolidate Siberia's inferior status as one of Russia's col-
onies. At the same time, they warned that the positive impact of the railway 
on the economic development of Siberia would be almost negligible. Instead 
of connecting the Urals and the Pacific with a trans-continental trunk line, it 
would be better to first link Siberia's regional centres with one another. Only 
after Siberia had caught up with European Russia in terms of economic de-
velopment should both parts of the empire be connected through modern 
infrastructure. Critical remarks of this kind remained, of course, unheard in 
the capital. Far from being inclined to heed the advice of the Siberian op-
position, St. Petersburg saw the emergence of regionalist tendencies on the 
periphery as an alarming signal of separatism, underlining the urgent need 
to tie Siberia more tightly to European Russia with the iron chains of a trans-
Siberian railway. 34 
All of these examples illustrate that the construction of railways in the 
Russian Empire contributed significantly to the consolidation of autocratic 
rule within the borders of the realm. If we try to identify the centripetal 
forces that helped strengthen Russia's territorial integrity before the First 
World War, the network of the empire's railways, which connected the im-
perial centre with its peripheries, has tobe at the top of the list. However, this 
is only one part of the story. Apart from the impact of railways on the con-
solidation of Russia's territoriality, one has to take into account the fact that 
the introduction of new means of transportation and communication also 
had unintended side-effects and contributed to processes of political desta-
bilization and territorial disintegration. 
33 E. Iu. Petri, "O narodonaselenii Sibiri i o Velikoi Vostochnoi zheleznoi doroge", Zhe-
leznodorozhnoe delo 7 (1888), 267-283, 267-274; W. Faust, Russlands goldener Boden. Der 
sibirische Regionalismus in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Cologne, 1980), 342, 
394-397. 
34 Marks, Raad to Power, 54. On late imperial colonization in general: F.-X. Coquin, 
La Siberie. peuplement et immigration paysanne au XIXeme siede (Paris, 1969); D. W. 
Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration. Government and Peasant in Resettlement from 
Emancipation to the First World War (Princeton, 1957); B. A. Anderson, Interna/ Migration 
during Modernization in Late Nineteenth-Century Russia (Princeton, 1980); L. M. Go-
ryushkin, "Migration, Settlement, and the Rural Economy of Siberia, 1861-1914", in The 
History o f  Siberia. From Russian Conquest to Revolution, ed. A. Wood (New York, 1991), 
140-157; D. Moon, "Peasant Migration and the Settlement of Russia's Frontiers, 
1550-1897", The Historical Journal 40 (1997), 859-893. 
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3. Railways and the Destabilization of Power
There is no doubt that the construction of railways in Tsarist Russia did 
more than strengthen autocratic rule in the largest continental empire. The 
new means of communication confronted the regime with a variety of new 
challenges and dangers. These resulted, on the one hand, from the specific 
circumstances of building large-scale infrastructure in the vast expanses of 
the Russian Empire, and, on the other hand, from a variety of distinctive fea-
tures of railways as a modern means of communication and transportation. 
First, as already mentioned, the construction of railways in Imperial Rus-
sia was a highly expensive endeavour. The Romanovs ruled an empire that 
was not only large but also economically underdeveloped. In contrast to the 
USA, where the construction of a nation-wide railway network was realized 
by private agents of the market economy, the Russian Empire, still retaining 
socio-economic structures of feudalism, could not rely on similar financial 
resources and institutions. The most important problem of railway-building 
in the Tsarist Empire from the very beginning was the lack of sufficient (pri-
vate) capital. That is why many of Russia's strategic railways and all the im-
portant trans-continental trunk lines were state projects funded with credit, 
a fact that was increasingly detrimental to the financial standing of the em-
pire. The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, connecting the city of 
Chelyabinsk in the Western Urals with Vladivostok at the Pacific and the co-
lonial harbour of Dal'nyi on the Liaodong peninsula, absorbed the gigantic 
sum of 1.5 billion roubles - five times more than originally planned. Be-
tween 1891 and 1914, seven to eight per cent of the annual state budget was 
invested in the construction and operation of the trans-continental rail-
way.35 Many contemporaries argued that the defence of Russia's interests in 
the Far East was not worth such a large financial investment. In contrast to 
the perception in Western European and North American countries, where 
the Trans-Siberian Railway from the very beginning nourished one of the 
strongest railway myths in history, there was little enthusiasm among the 
Russian public, for instance when the country 'celebrated' the tenth anniver-
sary of the laying of the foundation stone in 1901.36 Even at the time many 
realized that consolidating the empire's vast and expanding territory in Asia 
with the help of expensive railway networks meant that the development of 
the infrastructure in the European part of the country would receive less fi-
35 1. V. Lukoianov, "Velikaia Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga i KVZhD" in S. Iu. Vitte, So-
branie sochinenii i dokumental'nykh materialov, vol. 1, book 2, patt 1 (Moscow, 2002), 
123-158, 130; Marks, Raad to Power, 215. 
36 D. Destrem, "Obzor otzyvov pechati po povodu desiatiletiia Velikogo Sibirskogo 
rel'sovogo puti", Zheleznodorozhnoe delo 21 (1902), 27-29, 64-67, 79-80. 
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nancial resources. 37 Representatives of the Ministry ofWar, for example, had 
been complaining since the 1870s that Russia's Western borderlands were in 
urgent need of more strategic railways connecting the empire's periphery 
with its core, a doomed plea given the administration's commitment to rail-
way construction in Siberia and Central Asia.38 
Not only the construction but also the operation of Russia's expanding 
network of railways demanded increasing subsidies from the state. This re-
sulted partly from the fact that many lines had been constructed primarily 
for strategic and military purposes and had never been envisioned as econ -
omically self-supporting. Except for the five years between 1895 and 1899, 
the Russian railways did not yield a profit for the government but rather con-
tributed to the increasing deficit of the state budget. In 1907, for instance, the 
Tsarist administration had to invest about 120 million roubles in the empire's 
railway system. Witte, who had been the country's first prime minister in the 
years 1905-06, in 1910 laconically stated the lack of profitability of the 
country's railways: "If strategic and political factors did not play such an im-
portant role in the planning of our railway system and i f - like in the USA -
economic considerations prevailed, not only the layout of the network would 
look different but the entire system could probably be operated efficiently, or 
at least the respective financial deficit would be smaller."39 
Second, beyond the expense of providing the largest continental empire with 
an effective railway network, the operation of the expanding railway system 
confronted the Ministry of Communications in St. Petersburg with steadily 
aggravating difficulties. There is no doubt that the reputation of Russia's 
railways suffered increasingly from the sharp criticism of its commercial and 
private customers. The annually growing number of complaints in the 
archive of the Russian Ministry of Communications between 1909 and 1913 
indicate declining consumer satisfaction, and disastrous everyday condi-
tions on Russia's trains and in railway stations.40 There is one term that 
clearly dominated public discourse on railways in Tsarist Russia in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century: bezporiadok - chaos. Of course there 
37 W. Sperling, "Die 'Schicksalsfrage' der Kleinstadt: Eisenbahn, Raum und Indus-
trialisierung in der russischen Provinz, 1850-1914", in Jenseits der Zarenmacht. Dimen-
sionen des Politischen im Russischen Reich, 1800-1917, ed. W. Sperling (Frankfurt/Main, 
2008), 127-161, 156. 
38 W. C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia. 1600-1914 (New York, 1992), 29-28, 339, 
391,461. 
39 S. Iu. Vitte, "Nekotoryia soobrazheniia o prichinakh defitsitnosti russkoi zhelezno-
dorozhnoi seti", Zheleznodorozhnoe delo 29 (1810), 89-94, 91. 
40 "Po zhalobam raznykh lits na upravleniia zheleznykh dorog", Rossiiskii Gosudar-
stvennyi lstoricheskiiArkhiv (RGIA) f. 273, op. 10, d. 267 (1909), 352 (1910), 413 (1911), 
498 (1912), 554 (1913). 
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were many reasons for the lack of efficiency of the railway system, and the 
magnitude of the empire's territory was only one, but it was an important 
factor in this regard. 
When the railways were urgently needed to defend Russia's political and 
strategic interests, the system's lack of reliability became a vital problem. 
This was more than obvious during Russia's war against Japan, which was 
decided to a large extent on the tracks of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Japan 
chose to attack the Russian fleet in Port Arthur in February 1904, when the 
transport capacity of the Siberian railway was extremely low and Lake Baikal 
was still covered with thick ice, impeding the transfer of Russian troops by 
boat from the Western to the Eastern shores.41 The section of the Trans-Si-
berian Railway along the southern shores of the lake had not been finished 
because of extremely difficult geographical circumstances. At the time of the 
Japanese attack the Tsarist army was, therefore, confronted with almost in-
surmountable logistic difficulties. Even after the Ministry of Communi-
cations had built a temporary railway across the frozen Lake Baikal, enabling 
the army to start the transfer of mobilized troops to the Far East, and even 
after the completion of an uninterrupted railway line from the Urals to the 
Pacific, the Trans-Siberian Railway remained the critical requisite for the 
transport of Russia's provisions during the whole war. For financial reasons, 
the line had been constructed single-tracked and was not particularly 
strong. 42 Both factors entailed a worryingly low transport capacity for a line 
that had once been planned and envisioned as a powerful instrument to pro-
tect the strategic interests of the Tsar in the Far East. lt came as no surprise 
that after Russia's military defeat by Japan, the army command tried to 
blame the Ministry of Communications for the military fiasco. However, 
this was apparently also an attempt to distract the critics from the military's 
own strategic mistakes and shortcomings during the war. 43 
Third, it is difficult to assess how much the improper management of 
Russian railwaymen actually contributed to the military defeat of Tsarist 
Russia by Japan. In any case, the war clearly showed that the empire's infra-
structure not only reinforced Russia's territorial integrity, but at the same 
time became a highly sensitive foundation of the autocratic regime. The 
41 N. K. Struk, "Zheleznye dorogi vostochnoi Sibiri v Russko-iaponskuiu voinu 
1904-1905 gg." Sibirskii istoricheskii sbornik (1973), 21-41, 26; F. Patrikeeff and H. Shuk-
man, Railways and the Russo-Japanese War. Transporting War (London, 2007), 50. 
42 Marks, Raad to Power, 17 4. 
43 B. W. Menning, "Neither Mahan nor Moltke: Strategy in the Russo-Japanese War", 
in The Russo-japanese War in Global Perspective, ed. J. W. Steinberg (Leiden, 2005), 
128-156, 145-146; J. Kusber, "Siegeserwartungen und Schuldzuweisungen: Die Autokra-
tie und das Militär im Russisch-Japanischen Krieg 1904/05", in Der Russisch-Japanische 
Krieg (1904/05), ed. J. Kreiner (Göttingen, 2005), 99-116, 113. 
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more the Tsarist government used the railways as an instrument of imperial 
rule, the more it became dependent on the smooth functioning of the 
country's infrastructure. The multinational empire of the Romanovs was al-
ready being described by contemporaries as a body whose different parts 
were connected and sustained by the arteries of the network of railways. This 
affected both the body's 'head' in St. Petersburg and its 'heart' in Moscow.44
Accordingly, the people who were in charge of operating the Russian rail-
ways and were controlling the 'pulse' of the country's iron arteries bore great 
responsibility. They suddenly held a previously unknown power, which 
could easily be exploited politically and used against the autocratic regime. 
Russia's administration soon discovered that the steadily growing group of 
railwaymen controlled a means of communication that could also be con-
verted into a weapon of the regime's opponents. When, in the 1880s, high of-
ficials in St. Petersburg raised the idea of setting up a private railway police and 
entrusting employees of privately owned railway companies with police re-
sponsibilities, the Minister of the Interior filed his categorical objection. In the 
debate of the State Council, Count Tolstoy reminded his colleagues of the Ja-
nuary Uprising in Poland in 1863 and the participation of employees of the 
St. Petersburg-Warsaw railway in the revolt.45 Some railwaymen, Tolstoy re-
called, had openly supported the activities of the Polish insurgents and had 
thereby inflicted serious damage on the Russian state, instead of defending the 
empire's political and strategic interests.46 The gendarmerie of the Russian 
railways, which had been under the control of the Ministry of Communi-
cations in the 1860s, were unable to contain the chaos on the railway from 
44 As an early example of organic metaphors in Russian railway discourse cf. P. P. 
Mel'nikov, "Vsepoddanneishee donesenie o proekte ustroeniia zheleznoi dorogi mezhdu 
S. Peterburgom i Moskvoi 1841 goda" in P. P. Mel'nikov, ed. Voronin and Voronina, 
152-176, 176. 
45 "Obshchii ustav Rossiiskikh zheleznykh dorog': (St Petersburg, 1885), in Rossiia. 
Gosudarstvennyi Sovet. Materialy, vol. 158 (1885), Russian National Library, St Petersburg, 
525. On the punishment of the employees of the St. Petersburg-Warsaw railway who had 
participated in the Polish uprising of 1863, cf. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Feder-
atsii (GARF) f. 109, op. 2a, d. 775, II. l-2ob.
46 In December 1861 the Governor-General of the North-Western provinces V. I. 
Nazimov had already warned of the "ambivalent attitude of the administration to the 
newly opened [ St Petersburg-Warsaw] railroad and of the personnel of the line who are 
almost exclusively Polesand foreigners". Cit. after A. Rieber, "The Debate Over the South-
ern Line: Economic Integration or National Security", in Synopsis. A Collection of Essays in 
Honour ofZenon E. Kohut, ed. S. Plokhy and F. Sysyn (Toronto, 2005), 371-397, 377. In the 
1880s Warsaw Governor-General I. Hurko advocated that Poles should not be employed 
in the railway sector. Subsequently it was decided to ban Polish staff from the most stra-
tegic railway lines, a decision that was difficult to implement as there simply were not 
enough qualified Orthodox technical and engineering specialists to substitute for the 
Catholic professionals. A. Chwalba, Polacy w sluzbie Moskali (Warsaw, 1999), 214. 
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St. Petersburg to Warsaw. As one of the consequences of these events, in 1867 
the surveillance of the railway police was shifted to the newly founded agency 
of the shef zhendarmov, i.e. to the Ministry of the Interior. Tolstoy underscored 
that the security forces on the Russian railways were not only responsible for 
the protection of law and order in trains and at stations. They also had to 
watch over the loyalty and political activities of the employees of railway com-
panies.47 Consequently, the idea entrusting police responsibilities to the rail-
waymen, which was discussed in the 1880s, was unacceptable to the Minister 
of the Interior. Such a decision would have been equivalent to setting the fox to 
keep the geese. For Tolstoy, there was no doubt that Russian railwaymen from 
both private and state companies had to be supervised by the state and that 
this was one of the duties of the railway gendarmerie of his administration. 48 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century it became more and more ob-
vious that employees and workers of Russian railway companies were not 
only apt to support national liberation movements as they had done in Po-
land in 1863. They became a coveted target group for socialist and other rev-
olutionary propaganda. Railwaymen were an important group of workers 
and employees both in terms of quantity and in terms of their key position 
within the empire's 'nervous system'. Before the First World War, the number 
of Russian railwaymen reached one million. No other trade union before 
1917 was bigger than the railwaymen's organization. Revolutionary groups 
developed sophisticated plans to infiltrate the ranks of Russian railwaymen 
in order to intensify political agitation among this group and to gain control 
of the empire's transport system. In December 1881, for instance, Viacheslav 
Pleve, the director of the police in the Russian Ministry of the Interior, 
alerted the administration of the railway gendarmerie in a secret memoran-
dum that members of "social-revolutionary organizations" were planning in 
the near future to take over a number of restaurants at railway stations in 
order to use them for their revolutionary aims. As in Romania, where emigre 
revolutionaries had already employed a similar strategy with some success, 
Russian activists were planning to use railway restaurants for the funding of 
their own activities and for political agitation among railway workers and 
employees. The Russian police had received confidential information about 
these plans from loyal informants and warned local officers to be particu-
larly alert and attentive.49 
47 On the history of the Russian railway police: L. Timofeev, Spravochnaia kniga dlia 
chinov Zhandarmskikh Politseiskikh Upravlenii zheleznykh dorog po zhandarmsko-politseis-
koi chasti. Obshchiia obiazannosti zhandarmskoi zheleznodorozhnoi politsii (St Petersburg, 
1908), 1-3; Z.I. Peregudova, Politicheskii sysk Rossii (1880-1917 gg.) (Moscow, 2000), 
115-116. 
48 "Obshchii ustav Rossiiskikh zheleznykh dorog", 531. 
49 GARF f. 126, op. 1, d. 23, 1. 12. 
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century Russian railwaymen repre-
sented a pressure group that was increasingly difficult to control for the 
agencies of the Tsarist regime.50 This became apparent during the general 
strike of  October 1905, when the break-down of communications on the 
Russian railways brought nearly the whole country's economic and social 
life to a stand-still.51 One may argue that if the railwaymen had not partici-
pated in the strike movement of  1905, Nicholas II would probably never 
have signed the so-called 'October Manifesto', promising the election of  a 
national assembly and civil rights to his subjects. The network of railways in 
Russia, which had been envisioned from its beginnings as a powerful device 
in the hands of the Tsarist regime, turned in these days into a weapon in the 
hands o f  its political opponents. Oddly enough, the pre-modern political 
system o f  autocracy seemed to be more difficult to maintain in an empire 
with a modern system of infrastructure than it had been before Russia's jour-
ney towards modernity began. 
Fourth, the construction of railways restricted the power of the Tsar in 
one more respect. Since the end of the 1870s, Russian security forces had 
been almost obsessed with the fear of terrorist attacks targeted at the trains 
of  the emperor and his family. Accordingly, they spared neither cost nor ef-
fort to control and supervise the railway lines travelled by the Tsar in his lux-
urious coaches.52 Indeed, terrorist groups soon discovered Russia's railways 
as the Tsarist regime's sensitive and vulnerable Achilles heel and planned 
several attacks at the road-beds of rail lines travelled by the despised em-
peror.53 Already in 1865 the Tsarist authorities were alarmed by confidential 
reports from the Western borderlands about preparations for an assault on 
the emperor's train en route from Warsaw to Moscow. In May 1865, the 
Third Section Of His Imperial Majesty's Own Personal Chancellery reported 
on a meeting of  Polish subjects in the house of a railway guard named Malik, 
during which the plan to damage the railway tracks before the journey of 
50 R. Pethybridge, The Spread of the Russian Revolution. Essays on 1917 (London, 
1972), 20. 
51 S. I. Pushkareva, Zheleznodorozhniki Rossii v burzhuazno-demokraticheskikh revoli-
utsiiakh (Moscow, 1975), 154; Korelin and Tiutiukin, Pervaia revoliutsiia v Rossii, 302; 
H. F. Reichman, Railwaymen and Revolution. Russia 1905 (Berkeley 1987); D. Dahlmann, 
"Die gescheiterte Revolution - Russland 1905 bis 1907", in Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, 
117-135, 128-129. 
52 C. Dietze and F. B. Schenk, "Traditionelle Herrscher in moderner Gefahr: Adlige 
Handlungsmuster und das Konzept der Sicherheit im späten 19. Jahrhundert", Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft 35 (2009), 368-401. 
53 On the history of the 'Achilles heel' metaphor: A. Heywood, "'The Most Cata-
strophic Question': Railway Development and Military Strategy in Late Imperial Russia", 
in Railways & International Politics. Paths of Empire 1848-1945, ed. T. G. Otte and K. Neil-
son (London, 2006), 45-67, 63, FN 2. 
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Alexander II to Moscow had been discussed.54 In October 1869, a pseudony-
mous letter informed the police in Elisavetgrad that two young persons had 
recently settled in the city in order to commit a bomb attack on the train of 
Alexander 11.55 The authorities managed to prevent these assaults, but it was 
clearly just a matter of time before another political group would seize the 
opportunity and attempt to assassinate the Emperor when travelling 
through his country by rail. Terrorists knew that the network of railway lines 
was difficult for the authorities to control effectively and, therefore, offered 
an almost ideal site for attacks that needed long and complicated prepara-
tions. The fact that the emperor's train also operated by night facilitated the 
work of the terrorists under cover of  darkness. The activists counted on the 
operation of trains according to schedule, which made it possible to foresee 
the time of arrival of a train and to plan the destructive explosion a few min-
utes in advance. The terrorists expected the train's momentum to cause its 
derailment (if stopped at füll speed), so that the carriages would be com-
pletely crushed, 'hopefully' injuring or killing the train's passengers. 
The most famous terrorist attack on the imperial train of Alexander II 
took place on November 19, 1879 near Moscow and was almost 'successful', 
but hit 'only' the train of  the Tsar's court servants. The terrorist organ-
ization Narodnaia Volia had laid bombs at two different locations under the 
railway bed and planted one of their activists as a railway guard in a small 
village near Odessa. When one of the bombs finally exploded near Moscow, 
it was only a matter of chance that the Tsar escaped unhurt.56 lt was almost 
an irony of history that Tsar Alexander was finally killed by a bomb on 
March 1, 1881 on a carriage ride in St. Petersburg and that the well-known 
accident of the imperial train on October 17, 1888 near Borki was not the 
result of  a terrorist assault but of the poor condition of  the road-bed on the 
line near Kharkov. 57 On the evening of October 17, 1905, when Nicholas II 
signed the imperial manifesto, transforming Russia into a constitutional 
monarchy, the Tsar noted in his diary that on this very day Providence had 
54 GARF f. 109, op. 2a, d. 788, 1. l-3ob. 
55 P. Pomper, Se1gei Nechaev (New Brunswick, 1979), 97; idem, "Nechaev and Tsari-
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ary Russia. With a New Introduction by the Author (New Brunswick, 1998), 336-338. 
57 On the attempt of 1 March 1881: S. S. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr Vtoroi. Ego 
zhizn' i tsarstvovanie (Moscow, (1902) 2006), 947-948; H.-J. Torke, "Die Narodniki und 
Zar Alexander II. (1881). Ein Vorspiel zur Revolution''. in Das Attentat in der Geschichte, 
ed. A. Demandt (Cologne, 1996), 251-265; On the train accident of 17 October 1888 near 
Borki: Wortman, Scenarios of Power, 310-311; A. F. Koni, "Krushenie tsarskogo poezda v 
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saved the Russian monarchy once again - as seventeen years earlier at 
Borki- from even greater misfortune.58
4. Conclusion
lt is undoubtedly a promising intellectual endeavour to analyse and com-
pare the institutions and mechanisms which helped to consolidate and 
strengthen political rule in Europe's multinational empires in the nineteenth 
century. If we look at empires only from the perspective of  their collapse and 
disentanglement, we get a somewhat distorted picture of the modes and 
rules of political and social life within these complicated state structures, 
which actually existed quite successfully for several centuries. The ruling 
elite of  the empires repeatedly proved their ability to adopt new modes of 
political rule and to employ new technologies in order to stabilize the politi-
cal system in their large multinational countries in the nineteenth century. 
As previously, the development and application of  new tools o f  imperial rule 
often resulted from a state of  war, or from international competition in the 
political and economic fields. The Russian defeat in the Crimean War, for 
example, gave a strong impetus to the development of  a railway network in 
the largest continental empire. As a result, the modernization of  the empire's 
transportation system facilitated the relocation of troops from one part of  
the country to the other and opened new possibilities for the authorities to 
suppress both internal political revolts and military attacks from the outside. 
Moreover, the railways became an important tool of social engineering and 
economic exploitation in the empire's Asian peripheries. Whereas the ad-
ministration in St. Petersburg dreamt of  a new era of railway colonization in 
Russia's eastern border-lands, representatives of the regional elite in Siberia 
warned o f  the impending exploitation of  the country's natural resources. 
Notwithstanding the increasing efforts of  the Tsarist administration to 
develop the country's infrastructure, the construction of  a satisfying net-
work of railways remained a difficult endeavour. Building and running rail-
ways in an empire of this size was both extremely expensive and difficult to 
manage. In an economically backward country like Russia, the decision to 
supply the country's Asian peripheries with railway connections meant there 
was less state money remaining to build strategic railways in the West. As in 
other countries, the government became increasingly dependent on those 
social groups who were running the modern system of communications and 
whose political and economic demands could shatter the autocratic regime 
58 A. S. Burdykin, ed., Dnevnik imperatora Nikolaia II. 1890-1906 gg. (Moscow, 1991), 
239. 
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to its foundations. But whereas Western democracies managed to partially 
meet the social demands of  the new political forces of industrialized societies 
and to integrate them into the political debate, the system of  autocracy left 
less room for political manoeuvres and negotiations. Thus, paradoxically, 
the modernization ofRussia's infrastructure to a certain extent increased the 
vulnerability of  the autocratic political regime. This became obvious on the 
occasion of the terrorist assault against the train of Alexander II in 1879, and 
during the general strike of October 1905. 
The example of railway-building in Tsarist Russia may illustrate that the 
technical blessings of high modernity were not necessarily compatible with a 
pre-modern system of imperial rule. A political regime that increasingly de-
pended on the workers and employees of the country's transport system 
could only count on their loyalty if they were politically and economically 
satisfied. In the post-national era of  the twenty-first century empires have 
become more than merely a popular object of  scholarly analysis. In some re-
gions of  the world we can observe a renaissance of imperial thinking and 
even imperial nostalgia, as, for example, in Russia. 59 Proponents o f  such 
retrospective visions should be reminded how some of  the absolutist em-
pires in the nineteenth century were organized politically. Jane Burbank and 
Mark von Hagen have recently pointed out the fact that the "question of  
whether empire as a state form is compatible with institutional and ideologi-
cal democracy is [still] an open one."60 Especially from this perspective one 
may argue that the democratic nation-state offered European societies at the 
end of  the century an attractive alternative which was, at first glance, more 
compatible with the demands of high modernity than the empires from the 
so-called 'good old times'. 
59 S. Kotkin, "Mongol Commonwealth? Exchange and Governance Across the Post-
Mongol Space", Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8 (2007) 3, 487-531, 
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60 Burbank and von Hagen, "Coming Into the Territory", 25. 
